Robust efficient decision rules are not (ex post) Pareto dominated within the set of decision rules that satisfy some robust notion of incentive compatibility and other relevant constraints. Examples include public and private goods.
An example of an optimal robust bilateral trading mechanism where there is a bid-ask spread in some trading events.
with Jonathan N. Katz, 2016, revise and resubmit at the International Economic Review.
Nascent party structures, proto-parties, result from scarcity of plenary time in legislatures, which impacts both, the outcome of the legislative bargaining process and the organization of the legislature.
In the Baron and Ferejohn legislative bargaining model, assuming unequal discount factors and recognition probabilities, under minor parameter restrictions, the unique stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium has a simple closed form solution.
The notion of ex post constrained efficiency is appropriate for efficiency considerations in environments where a desideratum is robustness to informational specification.